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Back in October 2022, as Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he became the fifth consecutive UK leader to occupy the position in six years.

Triggered in the UK by Brexit, this represented exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is occurring in the French Republic, now on its sixth prime minister in two years – three of them in the past 10 months?

The current premier, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on Tuesday, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in exchange for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his government’s survival.

But it is, at best, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is locked in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for many years – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no easy escape.

Minority Rule

Essential context: from the moment Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a divided assembly split into three opposing factions – left, far right and his own centrist coalition – none with anything close to a majority.

Simultaneously, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its national debt level and budget shortfall are now nearly double the EU threshold, and hard constitutional deadlines to approve a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are approaching.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the president appointed his trusted associate Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be largely unchanged from before – he encountered anger from both supporters and rivals.

To such an extent that the next day, he resigned. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in modern French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “personal ambitions” would make his job virtually unworkable.

A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a last-ditch effort to salvage cross-party backing – a task, to put it mildly, not without complications.

Next, two ex-prime ministers publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were early elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the conclusion of his extension, he went on TV to say he believed “a path still existed” to prevent a vote. The president’s office confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister two days later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So recently – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the country’s rival political parties were “creating discord” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Would he endure – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a high-stakes speech, the young prime minister spelled out his budget priorities, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who detest Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were waiting for: Macron’s key policy would be suspended until 2027.

With the conservative Les Républicains (LR) already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the government should survive those votes, due on Thursday.

It is, however, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be demanding further compromises. “This move,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

A Cultural Shift

The issue is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.

A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to support their motion, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in two years is, similar to his forerunners, finished.

Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by some miracle, the divided parliament musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So is there a way out? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A fresh premier would face the same intractable arithmetic.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After a presidential vote, his replacement would disband the assembly and aim for a legislative majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Surveys show the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not escape its predicament until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Many think that cultural shift will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”